# Aadhaar, the most trusted ID, empowers people 

## BY AAY MHUSHANPANDEY

reedback@livemint.com

Today, Aadhaar is the most trusted ID and widely held unique identificationsystem in India which has the facility of authentication online and offline anytime, anywhere. Aadhaar has empowered 1.19 billion Indians with a credibleidentity.

Nowadays, the fact is that Aadhaar inspires more confidence and trust between per-son-to-person and person-tosystem than anyotheridentity document in India. Amost everysixth personin theworld holds an Aadhaar card.

Aadhaar-the 2 digitunique identification number-has tremendouspotental tobring revolutionary transformation as it empowers people in myriad ways so that a sense of enhanced security and trust prevails in the life of people at large.

And all this is possible because of Aadhaar, its technology, its platorm, itsauthentication infrastructure and its use as the verifiable identity. Aadhaarhasenabledone-sixth population on this planet to prove irrepudiably that $s$ he is theonewhoms/he claimstobe and hasbrought indigitalrevolution in the life of every Indian.
Truetoits transformational potentials of cleansing thesystem offakes, ghost and duplicates, Aadhaar has turnedinto a game changer in favour of poor. It has not only beenable tocreate secure and safe environs where people can trust a person with his verifiable ID buthasalsobeenaninsirument to curb black money, moneylaundering, check on benami dealing and banking frauds, improved tax compliance, enhanced transparency in the system, hassle-free deliveries of service, ease of life and business, etc.

However, Aadhaar is often under attack from various quartersmainly on themisconceivedgrounds of surveillance or Orwellian design that may significantlyaltertherelationship between the state and the citizen, ill percelved data "breach" or leakages, so-called exclusionsand denials, privacy invasion, etc. Let me dispel with due respect to the critics, some of the misperceptions.
At theonset, it ispertinent to know Social Security Number (SSN) story as to howoneof the developed democriciesUnited States of America introduced uniqueidentificationnumbers tocleanse theirsystem through anenactmentin 1935 foralimitedpurpose of providing social security benefits during the Great Depression. Later, in 1942, it expanded the scope through an executive order which mandated all federal agencies to exclusivelyuseSSN in theirprograms. In 1962,SSN was adopted as official Tax Identification Number (TIN) for income tax purposes. Furtherin1976,Social Security Act was further amended to say that any State may, in the administration of anytax, gen eral public assistance, driver's license, ormotorvehiclereglstration law utlize SSN for the purpose of establishing the identification of individuals andmay require any individual tofurnish SSN.
The mandatory use of SSN by the state did not gounchallenged in US courts which eventually heldmandatoryuse of SSN to be constitutional. It was held by the Federal Court in Doyle vs. Wilson Case that "mandatory disclosure ofone's social security number does not so threaten the sanctity of individual privacyas torequire constitutional protection." In other cases, courts held that "requiringanSSNonadriver's license application is not unconstitutional, nor is a requirement that welfare


Aadhaar has enhanced govt's ability to directly connect, reach, and serve people.
recipients fumish their SSNs" and "preventing fraud in federal welfare programs is an important goal, and the SSN requirement is a reasonable means of promoting that goal".
In United Kingdom, too, almost every important service requires National Insurance Number (NIN). It is required from those whowant to work, open bank accounts, paytaxes, want torecelvechild benefits, and even those who want tovote.
Arguing that neither SSN nor NIN is basedonbiometrics, critics object to collection of biometrics and the system of central number which can potentially link all the databases. They must understand, one, that the collection of biometrics by the state per se for a legitimatepurpose isanestab-lishedandincontestablepracticesanctioned bylawin india. One is statutorily required to give biometrics, if one wants a driverlicence, sellorbuyproperties, or obtain a passport.

Two, that creating asysiem of central number in a central database by thestateand wide-
spread mandatory usage of such number and itslinkingin most citizen databases, be it SSNin theUSorNINin the UK that potentially enables the statetotraceevery person, has neitherrendered theircitizens vulnerable nor have made these countries surveillance states. Obviously, there are safeguardswhich preventsuch things happening there.
Similarly in India, Aadhaar seeks to cleanse and upgrade systems to providetransparent and accountable governance with ease of business and life andaccords the highestsignificance to the privacy of people.
No doubt, Aadhaar has enhancedgovemment'sability todirectly connect, reach, and serve people which unfortunately areprojectedas increase in the state's power and Aadhaar being perceived as an instrument of state surveillance. But Aadhaar Act and Regulations have strong safeguards which will prevent it from being used as an "electronicleash" or an "instrument of state survelllance".
Please remember that Aadhaar is based on three core principles of minimalinformation, optimal ignorance and federated database, and therefore in its whole lifecycle, an Adhaar database contains only that much information thatyougive toitathetme of enroment or updation. It has your name, address, gender, date of birth/age and photograph and core biometrics (10 fingerprints and 2 irisscans). It also hasyour mobileandemall, If you give.

Also, the core biometrics is highlyencryptedathetimeof enroment/updation and is neverkeptunencryptedandis nevershared.

When people use Aadhaar for accessing various services, their information remains in silos of federated databases so
thateachagencyremains optimally ignorant. The Unique Identification Authority of India's (UIDAD) recent measures on VirtualID, UDD Token, andLimitedE-KYC willfurther strengthen privacy.
Aadhaar does not collector receive any information from anyservicesproviderorlinking exercise be it your bank accountorSIMormutualfund ordebit/creditcardorsharesor PAN, or your personal profile likeyour family, caste, religion, education, occupation, financial orproperty details, health records, etc.
And so far as UDAAl is concerned, itresponds tosuchverification requests by replying either "Yes" or "No". In few casesifrequiredand thereplyis "Yes", UDAA sends only your basic KYC details (name, address, photo, etc.) available withit. Thus, Aadhaarempowers people and not the state. Allegations of Indiabecoming a surveillance or "Orwellian" state, withpeople'sright todissent stifled are hence totally unfounded.
Furthermore, Aadhaar is legally backed by Aadhaar Act, 2016 which has strict provisions for privacy protection, data security and sharing, and also, stringentpenalties forviolation including three years imprisonment.
The Act coversthebasicten-etsofprivacyprotectionmeasures relating to informed consent, collection limitation, and use andpurpose limitationand sharing restrictions. More so, UIDAL-the Aadhaar issuing body-has zero tolerance policy againstanyviolation of Aadhaar Act 2016.

UDAIremainsopentoconstructive suggestions and will continue to continuously review and strengthenits system for the empowerment of people.

The author is the chief executive officer of the Unique Identification Authorityof mdia.

